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List of Tables and Figures |
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xii | |
Acknowledgments |
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xv | |
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xvii | |
Introduction |
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1 | (1) |
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1 | (4) |
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5 | (2) |
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7 | (7) |
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A Note on the History of the Project |
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14 | (2) |
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16 | (16) |
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16 | (3) |
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19 | (4) |
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23 | (8) |
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31 | (1) |
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32 | (20) |
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Madness and ``Bloodless Convention'' |
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32 | (3) |
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35 | (3) |
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38 | (1) |
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38 | (10) |
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48 | (1) |
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Overaggregation Bias and Data Problems |
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48 | (3) |
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51 | (1) |
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52 | (35) |
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52 | (3) |
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55 | (7) |
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62 | (2) |
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64 | (2) |
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The Technology of Warfare |
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66 | (4) |
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70 | (15) |
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85 | (2) |
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A Theory of Irregular War I: Collaboration |
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87 | (24) |
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87 | (2) |
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The Identification Problem |
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89 | (2) |
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91 | (13) |
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Forms of Collaboration and Defection |
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104 | (2) |
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The Institutional Setting of Collaboration |
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106 | (4) |
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110 | (1) |
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A Theory of Irregular War II: Control |
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111 | (35) |
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The Allocation of Collaboration |
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111 | (5) |
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116 | (2) |
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How Control Shapes Collaboration |
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118 | (6) |
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Causal Paths from Control to Collaboration |
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124 | (8) |
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The Distribution of Control |
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132 | (6) |
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Constraints on Military Options |
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138 | (3) |
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Violence and Discrimination |
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141 | (4) |
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145 | (1) |
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A Logic of Indiscriminate Violence |
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146 | (27) |
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The Incidence of Indiscriminate Violence |
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147 | (1) |
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Information and Indiscriminate Violence |
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148 | (1) |
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Deterrence and Indiscriminate Violence |
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149 | (2) |
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Counterproductive Effects of Indiscriminate Violence |
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151 | (9) |
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Why Does Indiscriminate Violence Occur? |
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160 | (7) |
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Accounting for the Puzzle |
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167 | (4) |
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171 | (2) |
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A Theory of Selective Violence |
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173 | (37) |
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174 | (2) |
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176 | (5) |
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Denunciation in Ethnic Civil Wars |
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181 | (2) |
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Is Selective Violence Possible? |
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183 | (9) |
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A Political Economy of Denunciation |
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192 | (3) |
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A Model of Selective Violence in Civil War |
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195 | (12) |
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207 | (1) |
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208 | (2) |
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Empirics 1: Comparative Evidence |
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210 | (36) |
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210 | (3) |
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213 | (5) |
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Full Control (Zones 1 and 5) |
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218 | (4) |
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No Control (Zones 1 and 5) |
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222 | (2) |
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Contestation (Zones 2, 3, and 4) |
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224 | (19) |
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243 | (3) |
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Empirics II: Microcomparative Evidence |
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246 | (84) |
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247 | (1) |
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248 | (1) |
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The Argolid: Political, Social, and Economic Background |
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249 | (5) |
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The Civil War in the Argolid |
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254 | (11) |
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After the End of the Occupation |
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265 | (1) |
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Violence: Descriptive Statistics |
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266 | (9) |
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Control: Descriptive Statistics |
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275 | (3) |
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278 | (12) |
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290 | (9) |
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Return to Manesi and Gerbesi |
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299 | (3) |
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302 | (8) |
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310 | (4) |
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Out-of-Sample Tests in Greece |
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314 | (14) |
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328 | (2) |
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330 | (34) |
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333 | (3) |
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Why Denounce? A Sociology of Denunciation |
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336 | (7) |
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The Range of Malicious Denunciation |
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343 | (8) |
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The Dark Face of Social Capital: The Social Basis of Malicious Denunciation |
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351 | (7) |
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Varying the Institutional Setting of Denunciation |
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358 | (4) |
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362 | (2) |
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364 | (24) |
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365 | (11) |
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Kto kovo? The Locus of Agency |
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376 | (5) |
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381 | (5) |
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386 | (2) |
Conclusion |
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388 | (5) |
Appendix A: Data Sources |
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393 | (19) |
Appendix B: Coding Protocols |
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412 | (11) |
Appendix C: Timeline of Conflicts |
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423 | (4) |
References |
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427 | (52) |
Index |
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479 | |