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xiii | (2) |
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|
xv | (2) |
NOTES ON THE AUTHORS |
|
xvii | (2) |
NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION |
|
xix | (1) |
ABBREVIATIONS |
|
xx | (12) |
GLOSSARY OF FOREIGN TERMS |
|
xxxii | |
INTRODUCTION |
|
1 | (12) |
PART I German War Policy and the Soviet Union 1940-1941 |
|
13 | (512) |
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I. HITLER'S DECISION IN FAVOUR OF WAR AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION |
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13 | (39) |
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1. The Situation after the War in the West |
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13 | (12) |
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2. The Turn to the East: Hitler's Decision of 31 July 1940 and its Consequences |
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|
25 | (5) |
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3. Programmatic Objectives vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and their Acceptance among the German Officer Corps |
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30 | (8) |
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4. Euro-Asian Continental Bloc and Maritime Strategy: Alternatives to the Turn to the East? |
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38 | (4) |
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5. German-Soviet Relations from Molotov's Visit to the Beginning of the War |
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42 | (10) |
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II. THE SOVIET UNION UP TO THE EVE OF THE GERMAN ATTACK |
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52 | (66) |
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1. Origin and Development of the Red Army |
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52 | (20) |
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2. The Red Army until the Beginning of the German-Soviet War |
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72 | (22) |
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94 | (24) |
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III. FROM ECONOMIC ALLIANCE TO A WAR OF COLONIAL EXPLOITATION |
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|
118 | (107) |
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|
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1. War-economy Aspects and Consequences of the Alliance with the Soviet Union 1939-1940 |
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118 | (18) |
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(a) German-Soviet Trade Exchange and Hitler's War Policy up to the Summer of 1940 |
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120 | (8) |
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(b) The Concept of Large-space Economy and the Russian Problem |
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128 | (8) |
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2. Economic Preparations for the War against the Soviet Union |
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|
136 | (51) |
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(a) Economic Aspects of the Operational Plan |
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136 | (6) |
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(b) First Preparatory Steps by the War Economy and Armaments Department |
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142 | (8) |
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(c) The Thomas Memorandum and its Consequences |
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150 | (4) |
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(d) The Establishment of the Economic Organization East |
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154 | (7) |
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(e) The Involvement of Private Enterprise |
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161 | (9) |
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(f) Economic Objectives of the Campaign |
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170 | (17) |
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3. Economic Framework for Military Planning |
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187 | (12) |
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(a) The German War Economy until the Spring of 1941 |
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187 | (4) |
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(b) Intensification of German-Soviet Trade |
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191 | (8) |
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4. The Equipment of the Eastern Army |
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|
199 | (26) |
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IV. THE MILITARY CONCEPT OF THE WAR AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION |
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|
225 | (161) |
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225 | (101) |
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(a) The Red Army in the Judgement of the Army High Command after September 1939 |
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226 | (14) |
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(b) Early Phases in Planning within the Army High Command up to July 1940 |
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240 | (15) |
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(c) Army Group B as `Security against the East' |
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255 | (2) |
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(d) The Operational Studies by Marcks and Lo(Beta)berg |
|
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257 | (18) |
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(e) Planning by the Army General Staff and Directive No.21 |
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275 | (10) |
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(f) The Deployment Directive for the Army |
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|
285 | (7) |
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(g) The Preparations of the Quartermaster-General |
|
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292 | (13) |
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(h) The Structure of the Army in the East and Deployment |
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305 | (15) |
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(i) The Assessment of the Red Army before the Attack |
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320 | (6) |
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|
326 | (50) |
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|
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(a) The Luftwaffe between the Battle of Britain and Barbarossa |
|
|
326 | (10) |
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(b) Assessment of the Soviet Air Forces 1939-1941 |
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336 | (17) |
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(c) Preparations for Deployment |
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353 | (23) |
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376 | (10) |
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|
|
|
V. GERMANY'S ACQUISITION OF ALLIES IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE |
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|
386 | (43) |
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|
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1. Romania in the Political and Economic Field of Force of the Great Powers |
|
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386 | (7) |
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2. The Vienna Arbitration Award of August 1940 and the Dispatch of a German Military Mission |
|
|
393 | (5) |
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3. Military Aspects of Romania's Inclusion in the Barbarossa Plan |
|
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398 | (11) |
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4. The Position of Hungary and Slovakia in the Preparatory Phase of Barbarossa |
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409 | (20) |
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409 | (15) |
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424 | (5) |
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VI. THE INVOLVEMENT OF SCANDINAVIA IN THE PLANS FOR BARBAROSSA |
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|
429 | (52) |
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1. Finland's Place in Hitler's Calculations at the Time of the Resumption of his `Eastern Programme' in the Summer of 1940 |
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429 | (7) |
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2. Finland as a Political and Economic Sphere of Interest between Stalin and Hitler |
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436 | (7) |
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3. Military Aspects of Finland's Inclusion in the Plans for Barbarossa |
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443 | (12) |
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4. German-Finnish Arrangements and Measures for Finland's Participation in the War against the Soviet Union |
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455 | (16) |
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5. Sweden's Position during the Preparatory Phase of the War against the Soviet Union |
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|
471 | (10) |
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VII. OPERATION BARBAROSSA AS A WAR OF CONQUEST AND ANNIHILATION |
|
|
481 | (44) |
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|
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1. Plans and Preparations for Securing `Living-space' |
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|
481 | (10) |
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2. Hitler's Ideological Intentions Translated into Orders |
|
|
491 | (22) |
|
(a) The Regulation of SS Activity in the Operations Area of the Army |
|
|
491 | (5) |
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(b) The Limitation of Military Jurisdiction |
|
|
496 | (11) |
|
(c) The `Commissar Order' |
|
|
507 | (6) |
|
3. Propaganda Preparations for the War of Annihilation and the Attitude of the Military Leaders |
|
|
513 | (12) |
PART II The War against the Soviet Union until the Turn of 1941/1942 |
|
525 | (731) |
|
1. THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS |
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|
525 | (308) |
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|
525 | (238) |
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|
|
|
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(a) The Opening of the Campaign |
|
|
525 | (1) |
|
(i) The offensive of Army Group Centre until the capture of the `land-bridge' between Vitebsk and Smolensk |
|
|
525 | (12) |
|
(ii) The offensive of Army Group North |
|
|
537 | (9) |
|
(iii) The battles at the frontier in the sector of Army Group South and the German advance into the Ukraine |
|
|
546 | (23) |
|
(b) Disputes about the Further Conduct of Operations |
|
|
569 | (1) |
|
(i) The question of the deployment of forces for the second phase of the campaign |
|
|
569 | (3) |
|
(ii) Vacillation in the directives for the conduct of the war from 19 July until the end of the month |
|
|
572 | (9) |
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(iii) The assessment of the enemy at the beginning of August |
|
|
581 | (7) |
|
(iv) Hitler's acceptance of the need to eliminate Moscow |
|
|
588 | (6) |
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(c) The Battle of the Ukraine and the Crimea |
|
|
594 | (17) |
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(i) The advance to the Crimea |
|
|
611 | (2) |
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(ii) The advance to the Don |
|
|
613 | (14) |
|
(iii) The conquest of the Crimea |
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627 | (4) |
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(d) The Attack on Leningrad |
|
|
631 | (23) |
|
(e) The Actions of German Naval Forces in the Baltic until the End of 1941 |
|
|
654 | (10) |
|
|
664 | (8) |
|
(i) The double battle of Bryansk and Vyazma |
|
|
672 | (12) |
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(ii) Plans for the resumption of the offensive |
|
|
684 | (9) |
|
(iii) The failure of the second offensive |
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|
693 | (9) |
|
(g) The Repulse of the Winter Offensive of the Red Army |
|
|
702 | (1) |
|
(i) Assessment of the situation and directives for the winter war |
|
|
702 | (5) |
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(ii) The crises in Army Group Centre and their effects on the command of the army |
|
|
707 | (18) |
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(iii) The fighting retreat of Army Group Centre until the stabilization of the front |
|
|
725 | (9) |
|
(iv) Winter fighting in the area of Army Group North until the re-establishment of a solid front |
|
|
734 | (17) |
|
(v) The defensive battles of Army Group South |
|
|
751 | (12) |
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|
763 | (70) |
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|
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(a) The Surprise Attack against the Soviet Air Force |
|
|
763 | (5) |
|
|
768 | (1) |
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(i) II and VIII Air Corps and the battles of encirclement of encirclement of Bialystok and Minsk |
|
|
768 | (2) |
|
(ii) The battle of encirclement at Smolensk |
|
|
770 | (3) |
|
(iii) II Air Corps in the area of Gomel, Bryansk, and Roslavl |
|
|
773 | (1) |
|
(iv) The use of the anti-aircraft units |
|
|
774 | (1) |
|
(v) The conduct of the air war in the Baltic until the beginning of August |
|
|
775 | (1) |
|
(vi) The thrust towards Leningrad |
|
|
776 | (2) |
|
(vii) V Air Corps support for Armoured Group I and Sixth Army to the Stalin line |
|
|
778 | (1) |
|
(viii) The breakthrough of the Stalin line |
|
|
778 | (1) |
|
(ix) IV Air Corps on the right wing of Army Group South |
|
|
779 | (1) |
|
(x) The Luftwaffe in the battle of encirclement at Uman |
|
|
780 | (1) |
|
(xi) The repulse of the Soviet thrust at Boguslav and Kanev |
|
|
781 | (1) |
|
(xii) Mopping-up operations in the southern Dnieper bend |
|
|
781 | (2) |
|
(xiii) Anti-aircraft units in the south |
|
|
783 | (1) |
|
(xiv) The battle of encirclement at Kiev (28 August-26 September) |
|
|
783 | (2) |
|
(xv) Support for the advance of Seventeenth and Sixth Armies by V Air Corps |
|
|
785 | (1) |
|
(xvi) IV Air Corps and the conquest of the Crimea |
|
|
786 | (1) |
|
(xvii) The setback at Rostov |
|
|
787 | (2) |
|
(xviii) The Luftwaffe on the Volkhov and at Tikhvin |
|
|
789 | (1) |
|
(xix) Air Fleet 2 and preparations for the attack on Moscow |
|
|
790 | (3) |
|
(xx) The double battle of Bryansk and Vyazma |
|
|
793 | (1) |
|
(xxi) The crisis west of Moscow |
|
|
794 | (5) |
|
|
799 | (3) |
|
(d) Attempts at an Independent Strategic Air War against the Sources of Soviet Strength |
|
|
802 | (12) |
|
(e) The Situation of the Luftwaffe at the Turn of 1941-1942 |
|
|
814 | (19) |
|
II. THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR THROUGH SOVIET EYES |
|
|
833 | (108) |
|
|
|
|
|
1. The Beginning of the War |
|
|
833 | (3) |
|
2. The Reorganization of the Supreme Command |
|
|
836 | (4) |
|
3. The `Fatherland War': Fight against Disintegration. Mobilization of Material and Manpower Reserves |
|
|
840 | (18) |
|
4. The Struggle for Leningrad |
|
|
858 | (7) |
|
5. The Battle of Smolensk |
|
|
865 | (5) |
|
6. The Fighting for the Ukraine |
|
|
870 | (6) |
|
|
876 | (6) |
|
8. The Repulse of the German Autumn Offensive at Leningrad and Rostov |
|
|
882 | (3) |
|
9. The Repulse of the German Attack on Moscow |
|
|
885 | (11) |
|
10. The Red Army's Counter-offensive at Moscow, December 1941 |
|
|
896 | (7) |
|
11. The Red Army's Counter-attacks at Leningrad and in the Crimea |
|
|
903 | (3) |
|
12. Methods of a War of Annihilation |
|
|
906 | (13) |
|
13. The Red Army's General Offensive in the Winter of 1942 |
|
|
919 | (9) |
|
14. The Establishment of the Anti-Hitler Coalition |
|
|
928 | (13) |
|
III. STRATEGY AND POLICY IN NORTHERN EUROPE |
|
|
941 | (80) |
|
|
|
|
|
1. German Operations in the `Finland Theatre' |
|
|
941 | (31) |
|
(a) Operation Platinum Fox (`Platinfuchs') against Murmansk |
|
|
941 | (4) |
|
(b) Operation Arctic Fox (`Polarfuchs') against the Murmansk Railway |
|
|
945 | (8) |
|
(c) Problems of German Naval and Air Operations in the Far North |
|
|
953 | (7) |
|
(d) Balance Sheet of Military Operations in Northern Finland to 1941-1942 |
|
|
960 | (6) |
|
(e) New Strategic Deliberations after the Turn of 1941-1942 |
|
|
966 | (6) |
|
2. Finnish Army Operations |
|
|
972 | (11) |
|
(a) Recovery of the Former Finnish Territories in Ladoga-Karelia and on the Karelian Isthmus |
|
|
972 | (4) |
|
(b) Conquest of East Karelia and Advance to the River Svir |
|
|
976 | (4) |
|
(c) Military Result of Operations in Southern Finland and the Problem of Joint Military Planning |
|
|
980 | (3) |
|
3. Political Balance Sheet of German-Finnish `Brotherhood-in-arms' to the Winter of 1941-1942 |
|
|
983 | (10) |
|
4. The Attitude of Sweden Following the German Invasion of the Soviet Union |
|
|
993 | (10) |
|
5. The Reaction of Occupied Denmark and Norway to Hitler's Attack on the Soviet Union |
|
|
1003 | (18) |
|
IV. THE DECISIONS OF THE TRIPARTITE PACT STATES |
|
|
1021 | (28) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
1021 | (20) |
|
|
1021 | (7) |
|
|
1028 | (6) |
|
|
1034 | (3) |
|
|
1037 | (4) |
|
|
1041 | (8) |
|
|
1041 | (2) |
|
|
1043 | (6) |
|
V. VOLUNTEERS FOR THE `EUROPEAN CRUSADE AGAINST BOLSHEVISM' |
|
|
1049 | (32) |
|
|
1049 | (4) |
|
|
|
|
|
2. Volunteers from Western and Southern Europe |
|
|
1053 | (17) |
|
|
|
|
|
3. Volunteers from Northern Europe at the Beginning of the War against the Soviet Union |
|
|
1070 | (11) |
|
|
|
|
|
VI. THE FAILURE OF THE ECONOMIC `BLITZKRIEG STRATEGY' |
|
|
1081 | (108) |
|
|
|
|
|
1. Economic Policy in Anticipation of Victory |
|
|
1081 | (15) |
|
|
1096 | (11) |
|
3. The Supply of the Army in the East until the Failure before Moscow |
|
|
1107 | (34) |
|
|
1114 | (3) |
|
|
1117 | (7) |
|
|
1124 | (17) |
|
4. The Food-supply Issue: Starvation Strategy or Pragmatism |
|
|
1141 | (39) |
|
(a) Self-supply by the Wehrmacht |
|
|
1150 | (7) |
|
(b) Selective Starvation Policy against the Soviet Civilian Population |
|
|
1157 | (15) |
|
(c) Mass Deaths among Soviet Prisoners of War |
|
|
1172 | (8) |
|
5. Economic Causes and Consequences of the Failed Blitzkrieg |
|
|
1180 | (9) |
|
VII. SECURING `LIVING-SPACE' |
|
|
1189 | (56) |
|
|
|
|
|
1. Pacification of the Conquered Territories |
|
|
1189 | (36) |
|
2. Implementation of the `Commissar Order' |
|
|
1225 | (10) |
|
3. The Organization of `Living-space' |
|
|
1235 | (10) |
|
OPERATION BARBAROSSA IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE |
|
|
1245 | (11) |
|
|
|
|
BIBLIOGRAPHY |
|
1256 | (97) |
I. Unpublished Sources |
|
1256 | (38) |
II. Service Regulations |
|
1294 | (2) |
III. Published Sources |
|
1296 | (57) |
INDEX OF PERSONS |
|
1353 | |