Algorithmic Game Theory
by Edited by Noam Nisan , Tim Roughgarden , Eva Tardos , Vijay V. VaziraniFormat: Hardcover
Pub. Date: 2007-09-24
Publisher(s): Cambridge University Press
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Summary
In the last few years game theory has had a substantial impact on computer science, especially on Internet- and e-commerce-related issues. More than 40 of the top researchers in this field have written chapters that go from the foundations to the state of the art. Basic chapters on algorithmic methods for equilibria, mechanism design and combinatorial auctions are followed by chapters on incentives and pricing, cost sharing, information markets and cryptography and security. Students, researchers and practitioners alike need to learn more about these fascinating theoretical developments and their widespread practical application.
Table of Contents
| Introduction | |
| Computing in Games | |
| Basic solution concepts and computational issues | |
| Algorithms for equilibria | |
| Equilibrium computation for games in strategic and extensive form | |
| Learning, regret minimization and correlated equilibria | |
| Graphical games | |
| Cryptography and game theory | |
| Combinatorial algorithms for market equilibria Vijay V. Vazirani | |
| Computation of market equilibria by convex programming | |
| Algorithmic Mechanism Design | |
| Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists) | |
| Mechanism design without money | |
| Combinatorial auctions | |
| Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms | |
| Profit maximization in mechanism design | |
| Distributed algorithmic mechanism design | |
| Cost sharing | |
| On-line mechanisms | |
| Quantifying the Inefficiency of Equilibria | |
| Introduction to the inefficiency of equillibria | |
| Routing games | |
| Inefficiency of equilibria in network formation games | |
| Selfish load-balancing | |
| Efficiency loss and the design of scalable resource allocation mechanisms | |
| Additional Topics | |
| Incentives and pricing in communication networks | |
| Incentives in peer-to-peer systems | |
| Cascading behavior in networks: algorithmic and economic issues | |
| Incentives and information security | |
| Computational aspects of information markets | |
| Manipulation-resistant reputation systems | |
| Sponsored search auctions | |
| Algorithmic issues in evolutionary game theory | |
| Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved. |
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