The Philosophy of Information

by Floridi, Luciano

ISBN13: 9780199232383

ISBN10: 0199232385

Format: Hardcover

Pub. Date: 2011-03-08

Publisher(s): Oxford University Press

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Summary

Luciano Floridi presents a book that will set the agenda for the philosophy of information. PI is the philosophical field concerned with (1) the critical investigation of the conceptual nature and basic principles of information, including its dynamics, u

Author Biography

Luciano Floridi is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hertfordshire -- where he holds the Research Chair in Philosophy of Information and the UNESCO Chair in Information and Computer Ethics -- and Fellow of St Cross College, University of Oxford, where he is the founder and director of the IEG, Oxford University interdepartmental research group on the philosophy of information. His research areas are the philosophy of computing and information, information/computer ethics, philosophy of technology, epistemology and philosophy of logic. For his work Floridi has received various prizes, awards and fellowships, including the APA Barwise Prize and the election as Fellow of the Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and the Simulation of Behaviour (AISB). He is the first philosopher to have been awarded the Gauss Professorship by the Gottingen Academy of Sciences. For more information, please visit his website: (http://www.philosophyofinformation.net)

Preface	p. xii
Acknowledgements	p. xv
List of figures	p. xvii
List of tables	p. xix
List of most common acronyms	p. xx
What is the philosophy of information?	p. 1
Summary	p. 1
Introduction	p. 1
Philosophy of artificial intelligence as a premature paradigm of PI	p. 2
The historical emergence of PI	p. 5
The dialectic of reflection and the emergence of PI	p. 7
The definition of PI	p. 13
The analytic approach to PI	p. 17
The metaphysical approach to PI	p. 19
PI as philosophia prima	p. 24
Conclusion	p. 25
Open problems in the philosophy of information	p. 26
Summary	p. 26
Introduction	p. 26
David Hilbert's view	p. 28
Analysis	p. 30
Semantics	p. 33
Intelligence	p. 35
Nature	p. 42
Values	p. 44
Conclusion	p. 45
The method of levels of abstraction	p. 46
Summary	p. 46
Introduction	p. 47
Some definitions and preliminary examples	p. 48
Typed variable	p. 48
Observable	p. 48
Six examples	p. 49
Levels of abstraction	p. 52
Behaviour	p. 53
Gradient of abstraction	p. 54
A classic interpretation of the method of abstraction	p. 58
Some philosophical applications	p. 60
Agents	p. 60
The Turing test	p. 61
Turing's imitation game	p. 61
Turing's test revisited	p. 62
Turing discussed	p. 63
Emergence	p. 63
Artificial life	p. 65
Quantum observation	p. 66
Decidable observation	p. 66
Simulation and functionalism	p. 67
The philosophy of the method of abstraction	p. 68
Levels of organization and of explanation	p. 69
Conceptual schemes	p. 71
Pluralism without relativism	p. 74
Realism without descriptivism	p. 75
Constructionism	p. 76
Conclusion	p. 78
Semantic information and the veridicality thesis	p. 80
Summary	p. 80
Introduction	p. 80
The data-based approach to semantic infomiation	p. 82
The general definition of information	p. 83
Understanding data	p. 85
Taxonomic neutrality	p. 86
Typological neutrality	p. 87
Ontological neutrality	p. 90
Genetic neutrality	p. 91
Alethic neutrality	p. 92
Why false information is not a kind of semantic information	p. 93
Why false information is pseudo-information: Attributive vs predicative use	p. 97
Why false information is pseudo-information: A semantic argument	p. 98
First step: Too much infomiation	p. 99
Second step: Excluding tautologies	p. 100
Third step: Excluding contradictions	p. 100
Fourth step: Excluding inconsistencies	p. 101
Last step: Only contingently true propositions count as semantic infomiation	p. 103
The definition of semantic information	p. 104
Conclusion	p. 106
Outline of a theory of strongly semantic information	p. 108
Summary	p. 108
Introduction	p. 109
The Bar-Hillel-Carnap Paradox	p. 111
Three criteria of information equivalence	p. 114
Three desiderata for TSSI	p. 117
Degrees of vacuity and inaccuracy	p. 117
Degrees of informativeness	p. 123
Quantities of vacuity and of semantic information	p. 125
The solution of the Bar-Hillel-Carnap Paradox	p. 127
TSSI and the scandal of deduction	p. 129
Conclusion	p. 132
The symbol grounding problem	p. 134
Summary	p. 134
Introduction	p. 134
The symbol grounding problem	p. 136
The representationalist approach	p. 137
A hybrid model for the solution of the SGP	p. 138
SGP and the symbolic theft hypothesis	p. 142
A functional model for the solution of the SGP	p. 143
An intentional model for the solution of the SGP	p. 144
Clarion	p. 146
The semi-representationalist approach	p. 149
An epistemological model for the solution of the SGP	p. 149
The physical symbol grounding problem	p. 150
A model based on temporal delays and predictive semantics for the solution of the SGP	p. 153
The non-representationalist approach	p. 155
A communication-based model for the solution of the SGP	p. 156
A behaviour-based model for the solution of the SGP	p. 157
Emulative learning and the rejection of representations	p. 159
Conclusion	p. 160
Action-based semantics	p. 162
Summary	p. 162
Introduction	p. 162
Action-based Semantics	p. 164
Two-machine artificial agents and their AbS	p. 166
Three controversial aspects of AM²	p. 172
Learning and performing rule through Hebb's rule and local selection	p. 173
From grounded symbols to grounded communication and abstractions	p. 176
Conclusion	p. 179
Semantic information and the correctness theory of truth	p. 182
Summary	p. 182
Introduction	p. 183
First step: Translation	p. 186
Second step: Polarization	p. 188
Third step: Normalization	p. 190
Fourth step: Verification and validation	p. 193
Fifth step: Correctness	p. 195
Some implications and advantages of the correctness theory of truth	p. 199
Truthmakers and coherentism	p. 199
Accessibility, bidimensionalism, and correspondentism	p. 201
Types of semantic information and the variety of truths	p. 203
A deflationist interpretation of falsehood as failure	p. 205
The information-inaptness of semantic paradoxes	p. 205
Conclusion	p. 208
The logical unsolvability of the Gettier problem	p. 209
Summary	p. 209
Introduction	p. 210
Why the Gettier problem is unsolvable in principle	p. 212
Three objections and replies	p. 217
Conclusion	p. 222
The logic of being informed	p. 224
Summary	p. 224
Introduction	p. 224
Three logics of information	p. 226
Modelling 'being informed'	p. 228
IL satisfies A₁, A₂, A₃, A₅	p. 229
Consistency and truth: IL satisfies A₉ and A₄	p. 230
No reflectivity: IL does not satisfy A₆, A₈	p. 232
Transmissibility: IL satisfies A₁₀ and A₁₁	p. 236
Constructing the Information Base: IL satisfies A₇	p. 236
KTB-IL	p. 237
Four epistemological implications of KTB-IL	p. 238
Information overload in KTB-IL	p. 238
In favour of the veridicality thesis	p. 239
The relations between DL, IL and EL	p. 240
Against the untouchable	p. 241
Conclusion	p. 243
Understanding epistemic relevance	p. 244
Summary	p. 244
Introduction	p. 245
Epistemic vs causal relevance	p. 246
The basic case	p. 249
Advantages of the basic case	p. 249
Limits of the basic case	p. 251
A probabilistic revision of the basic case	p. 251
Advantages of the probabilistic revision	p. 252
Limits of the probabilistic revision	p. 252
A counterfactual revision of the probabilistic analysis	p. 253
Advantages of the counterfactual revision	p. 253
Limits of the counterfactual revision	p. 253
A metatheoretical revision of the counterfactual analysis	p. 254
Advantages of the metatheoretical revision	p. 256
Some illustrative cases	p. 257
Misinformation cannot be relevant	p. 260
Two objections and replies	p. 261
Completeness: No relevant semantic information for semantically unable agents	p. 261
Soundness: Rationality does not presuppose relevance	p. 262
Conclusion	p. 265
Semantic information and the network theory of account	p. 267
Summary	p. 267
Introduction	p. 268
The nature of the upgrading problem: Mutual independence	p. 268
Solving the upgrading problem: The network theory of account	p. 274
Advantages of a network theory of account	p. 279
Testing the network theory of account	p. 284
Conclusion	p. 288
Consciousness, agents, and the knowledge game	p. 290
Summary	p. 290
Introduction	p. 290
The knowledge game	p. 296
The first and classic version of the knowledge game: Externally inferable states	p. 297
Synchronic inferences: A fairer version of the knowledge game	p. 298
Winners of the classic version	p. 300
The second version of the knowledge game	p. 301
The third version of the knowledge game	p. 302
The fourth version of the knowledge game	p. 307
Dretske's question and the knowledge game	p. 309
Conclusion	p. 313
Against digital ontology	p. 316
Summary	p. 316
Introduction	p. 316
What is digital ontology? It from Bit	p. 317
Digital ontology: From physical to metaphysical problems	p. 320
The thought experiment	p. 325
Stage 1: Reality in itself is digital or analogue	p. 327
Stage 2: The stubborn legacy of the analogue	p. 329
Stage 3: The observer's analysis	p. 330
Digital and analogue are features of the level of abstraction	p. 332
Three objections and replies	p. 334
Conclusion	p. 337
A defence of informational structural realism	p. 339
Summary	p. 339
Introduction	p. 340
First step: ESR and OSR are not incompatible	p. 344
Indirect knowledge	p. 345
Structuralism and the levels of abstraction	p. 347
Ontological commitments and levels of abstractions	p. 348
How to reconcile ESR and OSR	p. 349
Second step: Relata are not logically prior to all relations	p. 353
Third step: The concept of a structural object is not empty	p. 355
Informational structural realism	p. 360
Ten objections and replies	p. 361
Conclusion	p. 369
References	p. 372
Index	p. 401
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